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Re: 
Dear Clerk: 
Ruth Ann Jefferies v. Wilbur R. Jefferies 
Case no. 940373CA 
5G 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. W W 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ruth Ann Jefferies 
submits the following supplemental authority. The case is entitled In Re the Marriage of Gloria 
Bonita Bover and Larry Charles Bover, Iowa Court of Appeals No. 4-458/94-0213. This case 
has not been published on either Lexis or Westlaw. Accordingly, I have attached a copy of the 
case along with this letter. This case pertains to the issues outlined in Ms. Jefferies' brief at 
pages 16-21. Specifically, pages 7-17 analyze the issue in Point IV of Ms. Jefferies' brief. 
Sincerely, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
David S. Dolowitz 
DSD:mm 
Enclosure 
cc: Clark W. Sessions, Esq. (w/enc.) 
Jay W. Butler, Esq. FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 1 1 1995 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA 
No. 4-458 / 94-0213 
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF GLORIA BONITA BOYER 
AND LARRY CHARLES BOYER 
Upon the Petition of 
GLORIA BONITA BOYER n/k/a GLORIA BONITA JUILFS, 
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
And Concerning 
LARRY CHARLES BOYER, 
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, 
Dale B. Hagen, Judge, 
Larry Boyer appeals and Gloria Juilfs cross-appeals 
from the economic provisions of the parties' dissolution 
decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
Thomas D. Hanson and Brenda K. O'Neil of Hanson, Bjork 
& Russell, Des Moines, for appellant. 
Leslie Babich of Babich, McConnell & Renzo, P.C., Des 
Moines, for appellee. 
Heard by Donielson, P.J., cady, J., and Perkins, S.J.*, 
but decided en banc. 
*Senior judge from the 5th Judicial District serving 
on this court by order of the Iowa Supreme Court. 
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in Gloria's primary care and that Larry would pay $622.35 
per month in child support until Ryan was twenty-two or no 
longer attended school. Gloria sought an award of alimony 
of $500 per month until Larry's child support obligation 
ceased, and then alimony of $1000 per month. 
The district court awarded Gloria property it valued at 
$106,095 and $695 in debt. It awarded Larry property it 
valued at $67,682 and $13,000 in debt. Gloria was awarded 
fifty percent of Larry's 401(k) and pension plans as of 
June 30, 1993, and any accumulation of interest on her 
portion until December 31, 1993. Gloria was also awarded 
alimony of $500 per month for ten years. "To equalize the 
property distribution, and also recognizing and taking into 
consideration the greater benefit that Larry will be 
getting from Social Security," Gloria was ordered to pay 
Larry a cash settlement of $20,000. 
Larry appeals and Gloria cross-appeals. Larry asserts 
the trial court made significant valuation errors thus 
skewing the division of the parties assets and liabilities, 
and erred in awarding Gloria alimony. 
In her cross-appeal, Gloria claims the trial court 
erred in failing to offset the property division by the 
differential in the parties' social security benefits, 
should have awarded her alimony of $1,000 per month for ten 
years after Ryan reaches age twenty-two, should have valued 
the pension plan and 401(k) assets as of the date of trial, 
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bases her assertion on In re Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 
N.W.2d 656, 661 (Iowa 1989). 
Property settlements are within this court's equitable 
jurisdiction and it is not appropriate to develop a 
concrete rule concerning valuation dates in dissolution 
proceedings. In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 
435 (Iowa 1981). Prior cases have little precedential 
value and we base our decision primarily on the 
circumstances of the parties before us. In re Marriage of 
Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1991). After reviewing the 
record, we find Gloria did not contribute to the growth of 
Larry's pension and 401(k) plans after the time of 
separation and therefore, their growth should not be 
divided between the parties. See In re Marriage of Oakes. 
462 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Iowa App. 1990) (holding where the 
spouse had not contributed to the increase in the other's 
retirement account since the parties' separation, the 
increase in the retirement account should not be divided 
between them). We affirm the district court's decision to 
divide Larry's pension and 401(k) plans as of the date of 
separation. 
B. Valuation 
Larry asserts there is no basis in the record to 
support the trial court's valuation of the parties' 
property. He specifically contests the values placed on 
the marital home, the contents of the home, Gloria's 
7 
party during the marriage are generally not considered 
marital property). 
C. Equity of the Distribution 
Under the dissolution decree Larry received net assets 
of approximately $55,000 and Gloria received net assets of 
approximately $105,000. This was after setting off 
Gloria's inheritance of approximately $27,000. To equalize 
the property distribution, the trial court required Gloria 
to pay Larry a lump sum of $20,000, This created a 
disparity of $10,000 which the trial court ascribed to the 
greater future benefit Larry will be receiving from social 
security due to his higher income. 
Both parties contend the property division was 
inequitable. Larry asserts we should remedy the inequity 
by awarding him the entirety of his pension and 401 (k) 
plans. Gloria contends we should consider the parties 
anticipated social security retirement benefits earned 
during the marriage and offset Larry's property settlement 
by the difference. 
We first address Larry's request that we modify the 
provision of the decree granting Gloria one-half of Larry's 
401(k) plan and pension. Pension plans are treated as 
marital property in Iowa and are subject to equitable 
distribution. In re Marriage of Conger, 492 N.W.2d 715, 
716 (Iowa App. 1992) (citing In re Marriage of Mott, 444 
N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Iowa App. 1989)). In this case, Gloria 
gave up her position at Bankers Life so that Larry could 
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We conclude federal law preempts our courts from 
considering social security benefits in dividing the 
property of the marriage. We reach this conclusion after 
reviewing the provisions of the Social Security Actf 42 
U.S.C. §§ 301-433 (1988), the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Hisquierdo v. Hisauierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S. 
Ct. 802, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979), cases from other states, 
and our appellate courts' decisions. 
The Social Security Act provides a comprehensive scheme 
for awarding Social Security benefits to divorced spouses• 
A divorced spouse of an individual entitled to social 
security retirement or disability benefits qualifies for 
spousal benefits if he or she: (1) applies for such 
benefits; (2) is at least 62 years old; (3) is not entitled 
to his or her own primary benefit in an amount equal to or 
greater than one-half due his or her spouse; and (4) is not 
married. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (b) (1) (A) - (D) , 402 (c) (1) (A)-(D) . 
The Act also specifically prohibits assignment of 
benefits: 
[ t ]he r i g h t of any person to any future [ soc ia l 
s e c u r i t y ] payment i s no t t r a n s f e r a b l e or 
ass ignab le , a t law or in equi ty , and none of the 
moneys paid or payable or r i gh t s exis t ing [] sha l l 
be s u b j e c t t o e x e c u t i o n , l evy , a t t achment , 
garnishment, or o ther l ega l process , or to the 
operat ion of any bankruptcy or insolvency law, 
42 U.S.C. § 407(a ) . 42 U.S.C, § 659(a) excepts the 
c o l l e c t i o n of c h i l d s u p p o r t and alimony from t h e 
ant i -ass ignment provis ion of § 407(a). In turn, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 622(c) makes i t c l e a r t h e p r o p e r t y t r a n s f e r s 
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California community property law was preempted by the 
express terms of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 
U.S.C. §§ 231a-u. Specifically the court found 45 U.S.C. § 
231m, the anti-assignment clause, demonstrated Congress* 
intent to preclude claims based on marital and family 
obligations and ensure the benefits actually reach the 
beneficiary.1 Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 584-85, 99 S. Ct. 
809-10, 59 L. Ed. 2d 12-13. The clause provides: 
Notwithstanding any other law of the United 
States, or of any State, territory, or the 
District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental 
annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any 
tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal 
process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor 
shall the payment thereof be anticipated. 
45 U.S.C. § 231m. 
Although Hisquierdo involved railroad retirement 
benefits, the court's reasoning is applicable to this 
case. The court analogized the Railroad Retirement Act to 
the Social Security Act and found Tier I railroad 
retirement benefits are equivalent to those employees would 
receive if covered by social security. Hisquierdo 439 U.S. 
at 574-75, 99 S. Ct. at 804-05, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 6-7; 
Conger, 492 N.W.2d at 716. Furthermore, § 231m of the 
Railroad Retirement Act and § 407(a) of the Social Security 
Act contain similar language against attachment and 
1. We note that following Hisquierdo, Congress amended 
the Railroad Retirement Act to permit distribution of "Tier 
II" benefits in dissolutions. Pub. L. No. 98-76, § 419, 97 
Stat. 411 (1983) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. 
231m(b)(2) (1988)). 
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employer and employee contributions to the program through 
the payment of taxes- Flemminq, 363 U.S. at 609-10, 80 S. 
Ct. at 1371-72, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1443. Furthermore, Congress 
may legislatively alter, amend, or repeal the benefits 
program at any time, Taylor, 967 F.2d at 964; Olson, 445 
N.W.2d at 6, or early death may prevent a person from 
receiving benefits. Any of these results would render the 
present value of the parties1 social security benefits 
illusory. 
Additionally, courts in other states have recognized 
the need to defer to the federal social security plan. 
Those states which have addressed the treatment of social 
security benefits in formulating the economic terms of the 
dissolution decree, have primarily concluded the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States constitution precludes states 
from intervening in the allocation of social security 
benefits. See Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 206 (Md. 
App. 1993); Olson, 445 N.W.2d at 11; Swan, 720 P.2d at 749; 
Cruise. 374 S.E.2d at 884; Richard. 659 S.W.2d at 749; 
Umber v. Umber. 591 P.2d 299, 301-02 (Okl. 1979); but see 
Ponqc?ni5 Vt Ponqoni?, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me. 1992); In re 
Marriage of Knipp, 809 P.2d 562, 564 (Kan. App. 1991); 
Hoaan v. Hoaan, 796 S.W.2d 400, 406-07 (Mo. App. 1990). 
We acknowledge that our appellate courts, without 
specifically addressing the issue confronted in this case, 
have permitted social security benefits to be considered in 
making a property award. Sg£ In re Marriage of Miller. 475 
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benefits may be considered in awarding property in a 
dissolution action. 
Our supreme court has permitted military retirement pay 
to be considered in dividing the property of a marriage. 
In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 424-427 (Iowa 
1980) . An important basis for this holding, however, was 
the finding that the federal legislation establishing 
military retired pay did not, unlike the federal 
legislation governing railroad retirement pay involved in 
Hisguierdo, evince a congressional intent to preclude state 
courts from considering such pay in formulating property 
settlements. Id. As noted earlier, the legislation which 
precluded state courts from considering railroad retirement 
pay in Hisguierdo is similar to the language of the Social 
Security Act. Thus, Schissel cannot be read to authorize 
consideration of social security benefits in dividing 
property. 
Our appellate courts have also permitted social 
security benefits to be considered in determining an award 
of alimony. See, In re Marriage of Bethke, 484 N.W.2d 604, 
608-09 (Iowa App. 1992); In re Marriage of Earsa. 480 
N.W.2d 84, 86 (Iowa App. 1991); In re Marriage of 
Wiedemann, 402 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 1987); In re Marriage 
of Voss. 396 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa App. 1986); In re 
Marriage of Jones. 309 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1981). This 
treatment, however, does not support the position that the 
benefits can also be considered in dividing property. 
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also be improper to consider them in the overall property 
division. The Supremacy Clause should not be circumvented 
by doing indirectly what is clearly directly prohibited. 
We conclude that social security benefits may only be 
considered as they impact alimony. This will best assure 
equity is achieved in a decree and will give symmetry and 
integrity to our governing legal principles. 
Accordingly, we reject Gloria's suggestion that we 
offset the difference in the parties' future social 
security benefits against Larry's property award. We 
further hold the trial court improperly considered the 
value of the parties social security benefits in the 
property division. If the social security benefits are 
excluded the difference in the parties* property awards is 
approximately $50,000. In order to create a more equitable 
distribution, we modify the trial court's order and require 
Gloria to pay a lump sum of $25,000 to Larry. 
III. Alimony 
Larry argues the trial court erred in granting Gloria 
alimony of $500 per month for ten years. He asserts Gloria 
has sufficient resources to support herself and Ryan in a 
comparable manner to that enjoyed during the marriage. In 
support of his contention Larry points to Gloria's net 
monthly income of $1719 per month, the $62 5 per month child 
support payment and the property settlement. 
In response Gloria argues the $500 per month alimony is 
necessary to compensate for the difference between the 
19 
substantial assets including one-half of Larry's retirement 
and 401(k) plans. 
While there is a disparity in earning capacity between 
the parties, it is not great. Larry earns a gross annual 
income of approximately $39,000. From this income he must 
pay child support of $622.35 per month, a monthly car 
payment of $675, and $500 per month on jointly incurred 
debts. 
In light of the parties' earning capacities and Larry's 
ability to pay, we believe the alimony should be reduced to 
$200 per month. This amount will help Gloria pay for 
health insurance and establish a retirement plan until she 
is able to locate full time employment. 
V« Attorney Pees 
Gloria also argues the trial court erred in failing to 
require Larry to pay a portion of her attorney fees. We 
disagree. 
Iowa trial courts have considerable discretion in 
awarding attorney fees. Giles. 338 N.W.2d at 546. To 
overturn the court's decision, the complaining party must 
show the trial court abused its discretion. Id. We find 
no abuse of discretion in this case. The trial court 
properly declined to award attorney fees. 
We also decline to award attorney fees on appeal. 
Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to each party. 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, 
All judges concur except Sackett, and Huitink, JJ. , who 
concur in part and dissent in part. 
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of SchisseL 292 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Iowa 1980); Locke v. Locke. 263 N.W.2d 694, 
696 (Iowa 1978)2; In re Marriage of Ralston. 242 N.W.2d 269, 271-72 (Iowa 1976); 
In re Marriage of Williams. 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972); Schantz v. Schantz. 
163 N\W.2d 398. 405 (Iowa 1968); In re Marriage of Bethke. 484 \.W.2d 604, 
608-09 (Iowa App. 1992) (we said: "we look at the presence or absence of social 
security benefits in analyzing the equity of the financial aspects of a dissolution."); 
In re Marriage of Earsa. 480 N.W.2d 84, 86 (Iowa App. 1991) (where in assessing 
alimony issue, we said: Her [wife's] earning capacity has been similar to Mark's 
[husband's]. She has, therefore, during the marriage made similar FICA contributions. 
Her social security coverage is for both disability and retirement."); In re Marriage of 
Miller. 475 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa App. 1991) (in addressing property division 
issues, we said: "In making this determination, we consider, as we did earlier, the fact 
that his social security contributions exceed Barbara's [wife's]; In re Marriage of 
Woodward. 426 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Iowa App. 1988); In re Marriage of Voss. 396 
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa App. 1986) (court considered wife had little or not payments 
to an FICA account in her own name and, while she had dependency benefits because 
2
 The majority, while recognizing the holding in Locke was that the case was 
remanded for the trial court to consider, among other things, the "presence or absence of 
social security benefits", distinguished Locke because it was decided prior to Hisquierdo. 
What the majority has missed is Locke was cited and not distinguished by the court in In re 
Marriage of Jones. 309 N.W.2d at 460. Jones not only was decided after Hisquierdo but the 
court in J^ nssLsaid as to military retirement pay, "Without attempting to divide the retired pay 
itself, the trial court in that case, [citing In re Marriage of SchisseL 292 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 
1980)], in its property division, took the future retired pay into consideration and added an 
estimated sum, $8000, to the wife's side in adjusting the parties' equities. We deemed this 
also to be an appropriate way to handle pension benefits, Jones. 309 N.W.2d at 460 (citing 
SchisseL 292 N.W.2d at 427), and we found no interference with federal law which would 
nun afoul, Hisquierdo v Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. 572, 99 S. Ct. 802, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979). . 
. . With these decisions charting our course, we hold that the trial court could not split the 
military retired pay itself, but properly took it into consideration in requiring Charles to Pay 
Geraldine monthly sums of money. Jones. 309 N. W.2d at 460 (citing SchisseL 292 N.W.2d 
at 427). 
The majority's reasons for distinguishing Locke are without basis. 
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principles of equitable distribution concerning pensions clearly established 
in Iowa statutory and common law. 
H a t 51. 
I find the property division equitable and would affirm it. I would concur withe 
the majority on the alimony issue. 
